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BINGHAM & GARFIELD RAILWAY
COMPANY, a Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant.

vs.
NORTH UTAH MINING COMPANY 1
a Corporation; '_llHE RIGHT

HON-~

No. 2877.

ORABLE WILLIAM HOOD LORD
WALTERAN; THE HONORABLE
CYRIL A. LIDDLE, and WILLIAM
ROBBINS.
Defendants and Respondent8.

Appeal from Thi1·d Judicial Dist'l·iet Court, Salt Lake
Oounty, Utah, Ilon. J?. C. Loojbo1a-r·ow, Judqe.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT ROBBINS.
In the month of June, 1910, the deefndant, Robbins,
obtained a lease on all of the North Utah Mining Company's property, commanded by the No.2 Red Wing Tun-

nel. (Abs. p. 25.) This lease ran for two years and covered all of the ground which was embraced within the
No.1 and No.2 tunnels, also that covered by the Robbins'
tunnel, and all of the ground embraced in what was described in the evidence as the Robbins stope.

(Abs. 26.)

Immediately after receiving the lease, Mr. Robbins
hired an employee and also worked himself when occasion required, and cleaned out Tunnel No. 1, occupymg
about 35 or40 days in this work. (Abs. 27.)
Afterwards the Robbins tunnel was started, as that
was considered by the deefndant, Robbins, a more practical way of removing the ore. The Robbins' tunnel was
run to strike the ore on the fissure and the bedded vein.
The work on this tunnel had occupied possibly a month
when the defendant was notified to quit work. An order
of possession was given the plaintiff, and the defendant
ceased work. This tunnel had been driven, including the
open cut, about 40 or 45 feet.

(Abs. p. 28.)

The plaintiff took possession on the ground and
drove a large tunnel through the mountain and immediately above the Robbins' stope, and the workings connected therewith.

A large abutment was constructed,

and the Robbins tunnel completely filled in. Large piers
were constructed down the swale, immediately below the
leased premises, and also on the leased premises, and a
large force of men worked for the plaintiff until May,
]911.

The plaintiff occupied and used in this work all

of Tract A, and the ground embraced within plaintiff's
lease, and also used and occupied the ground off the right
of way for a dump for the material removed in driving
the tunnel.
After the order of possession, the defendant Robbins,
did no further work; he testified that 'after the company
commenced work, he could do nothing because plaintiff
had a large number of men there grading out for the big
abutment which they built against his tunnel, and filled
it in with concrete so he could not use it afterwards. The
plaintiff's men were working from the mouth of the tunnel down to the road in the bottom of the canyon, and
his tunnel was right at the point where the abutment was
placed, and their work shut off the work of the Robbins'
stope entirely. That before the plaintiff took possession,
he had room to dump in the swale, and dumping could
have been done without any expense.

(Abs. pp. 20 and

30.)
That after the railroad was built, he could not dump
on the right of way. That he had asked Mr. Goodrich if
he could dump there, and the request had been refused.
(Abs. pp. 30 and 405.) There was no dump room outside
of the right of way.

The hillside was much steeper on

either side of the right of way than it was on the right of
way, and the houses below made it practically impossible
for him to dump there, and after the railroad was built,
he could not take the ore from the Robbins' stope without
putting in timbers to hold the track up; that it would not
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be safe to mine there unless this was done, and the expense would not justify him in thus timbering the stope,
and consequently he had to abandon the lease. (Abs. pp.
30 and 31.)
Counsel for plaintiff do not contend that the offer to
amend or the offer to release certain of the condemned
premises, and accept less than that asked for

in

the

amended complaint, could affect the defendant Robbins.
At the time of the first trial, and of course at the time of
the second trial, Robbins' lease had long expired, anc.l
he had no rights whatever in the premises. Mr. Ellis on
behalf of the plaintiff stated in open

court

that the

amendments or offer.s would not affect the plaintiff, Ron
bins.

(Abs. p. 330.)

The only errors assigned and discussed, so far as
affecting the defendant, Hobbins, is the giving of instruction No. 18, to the effect that after the order of possession, the deefndant, Robbins, had no right to dump rock or
earth on the right of way unless the jury found by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff, subsequent
to the court's order, gave the said Robbins permission to
dump rock and earth upon said area, nor did the defendant have any right to build any track across said right
of way for the purpose of hauling the ore or waste, or for
any other purpose, nor did he have any right after the
order of possession, to work underground in the leased
premises, if such work would have in any wise impaired
the subjaeent sunport of the right of way.

(See plain-
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tiff's brief, p. 26.) That the defendant, Robbins, was not
acting in good faith in taking the lease and in driving
the Robbins' stope. That the defendant, Robbins, suffered
no damages.
We will discuss these assignments in the same relative order as discussed by plaintiff in its brief.

I.
As to the right of the defendant, Robbins, to dump
ore or waste 1rpon the right of way without the consent of
the plaintiff, and to build a track across the same for his
own conven1,ence.

Plaintiff in its complaint asked for the tracts sought
to be condemned in their entirety without any reservations or limitations whatsoever. It did not seek to qualify
its demands in the original petition, or amendments thereto, nor was any such limitation or qualification ever heard
of until the close of plaintiff's case in the second trial,
which was practically three years after the lease to Robbins had expired.

Counsel for plaintiff at

the

trial,

strenuously sought to show that Robbins was granted
permission by agents of the defendant company to dump
on the right of way; thjs question was fairly submitted to
the jury whether such p(:'rmjssion had been given or not.

It must be further noted that the plaintiff occupied
the entire tract from December, when

it

commenced

work, until the following May; that is, men were working from the tunnel bore to the bottom of the canyon, were
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blasting, dumping, excavating for abutments and piers,
and driving immense tunnels in close proximity where
the ore bodies of defendant Robbins were situated and doing all work necessary for the erectio:n of its road and
bridges. During that entire time it was absolutely impossible for Robbins to do any work in connection with his
lease. His tunnel was filled in, the abutment was built at
the place where it was necessary for him to work, the railroad tunnel was a few feet overhead, and the only available dump room was occupied by the company. After the
construction of the track, tunnels and bridges, the plaintiff still controlled the tracts it sought to condemn and
had the right of absolute control over them.
That the company has exclusive possession will be
seen by the following authorities:
''There is no question but that the company
1s entitled to the exclusive possession of the
right of way, if such possession is necessary to
the proper operation of the road. Some courts
hold that the company is entitled to such exclusive possession from the nature of the case and
as matter of law."
2 Lewis Em. Dom. Sec. 84 7.
''The use by a railway company of land
condemned, for its road, is practically an exclusive one, and permanent in its nature, unless the
statute, or the court in its order, limits the ease-
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ment to be acquired by reserving certain rights
and privileges to the land owner, or unless such
limitation is conceded by the company.''
15 Cyc. page 1023, and cases cited.
In the case of Guthrie, etc., Co. vs. Faulkner, Okla.
73 Pac. 290, the court says :
''Whether such an appropriation is called a
fee simple title or merely an easement, it is apparent that such an appropriation is a permament taking and holding of the real estate, to the
exclusion of the owner, for all practical purposes, and, while it is taken for an express purpose, the effect as to the landowner is to deprive
him of the use of his land.''

In St. Onge vs. Day-Col. 18 Pac. 279, it is held that:
"The owner of land through which a railway
company has the right of way, actually in use for
railway purposes, cannot himself use such right
of way, or recover for trespasses committed
thereon by others; the railway company being entitled to the exclusive use thereof.''
In Wilmot vs. Railroad Company, Miss. 24 S. 701,
the court says :
"The duties imposed by law upon a railroad
company of safely carrying persons and property, and of protecting employees and other persons lawfully upon the right of way from damages arising from any obstruction or hindrance
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of the servants of the company in the performance of their duties, and the responsibility laid
upon the company for the performance of such
duties, require the right and power in the officers
of the company of excluding at their pleasure all
persons from the right of way. The occupancy
of the right of way by the railroad company is
practically exclusive, and the owner of the servient estate, could cultivate it only by the consent of the railroad company.''
See also:
Railroad Company vs. Comstock, 22 Atl. 511;
Hazen vs. Railway Company, 2 Gray 580;
Brainerd vs. Clapp, 10 Cush. 12;
Railway Company vs. Potter, 42 Vt. 275;
Rand Em. Dom. Sec. 215.
In Paxton vs. Railroad Company, Miss. 24 S., 536, it
is held the owner of land through which a railroad passes
has no right to cultivate the latter without its consent.
See also:
Railway Company vs. Cocks, et al., 22 N. Y.
Sup. 1017;

R. R. Co. vs. Olive, et al. N. C. 55, S. E. 263.
In Boston etc. Railroad Company vs. Hunt, Mass.
96 N. E. 140, the court holds:
''The right of way, even if defined as a public easement obtained by condemnation of the
land, is substantially absolute so long as used for
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the purposes of a railroad by the corporation, or
those succeeding by legislative sanction to its
rights. It is because of these characteristics of
complete possession and control that damages
for the taking are assessed upon the theory that
the occupation will be permanent and practically
exclusive.''
See:
Presbrey vs. Railway Co. 103 Mass. 1.
Barnes vs. Railroad Co. 130 Mass. 388.
Steel Company vs. Railway, 187 Mass. 500;
73 N. E. 646.
In Hopkins et al. vs. Railway Company, Minn., 78
N. W. 969, the court held (page 970):
''The railroad company Is entitled to the
exclusive possession of the land, unless otherwise expressly provided in the order of the court,
so long as it sees fit to use it for the purpose for
which it was acquired; that it is for the railroad
company and it alone to determine, when it deems
it necessary or proper to use the land for such
purposes, and when it takes possession, the burden is not on it to show that the manner of the
use is necessary. * * * There are manifest
reasons, founded on public policy and necessity,
why the possession of land acquired for railroad
purposes should ordinarily be exclusively in the
company, and not concurrently in it and the former owner. If the contention of the plaintiffs
should prevail, it would produce interminable

lO

vexatious litigation. The result would be that,
every time a railway company attempted to take
possession of property which it had acquired for
a railroad purpose, it would be liable to be involved in a contest with the former landowner
over the question whether such possession was
presently needed for the pupose for which the
property was acquired, or whether the continued
possession and use of the land, or some part of
it, by the landowner, was compatible with its use
by the company for the purpose for which it was
condemned.''
In Railroad Company vs. Comstock, Conn., 22 Atl.
511, the court says:
''A land owner, through whose premises a
railroad right of way has been condemned, cannot
require that a crossing be kept open over the
track in order that he may have more convenient
access to portions of his land lying beyond it,
though such crossing may not interfere with the
use of the right of way for railroad purposes."
"Counsel virtually rest their entire case, so far as the
question under discussion is concerned, on the authority
of Kansas City Railway Company vs. Allen, 22 Kan. 285.
In that case the company contended that the owner
of the premises would have a right of way to pass under
the railroad track with his teams and stock. It presents
a much different question from the one at bar. Certainly
opposing counsel would not contend that the dumping of
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ore and waste on the right of way, against steel stringers
and braces and concrete pillars, is analogous to the driving of stock underneath the bridge, or that the building
of a track for dump purposes is similar to walking across
a right of way.
Counsel in their brief say :
''But where, as here, the line of railway track
is constructed across a bridge some 200 feet in height
above the surface of the ground and cars are run
across this track, there would seem to be no reason
for the rule giving exclusive possession to the surface of the soil far below the railway track across
which cars are operated. And this, too, where the
railroad operators themselves, in the condemnation
proceeding, are willing that the owner of the fee
shall use the surface beneath the location of the track
and state, under oath, that such use will not and cannot interfere with or injure in any way the support,
maintenance or operation of the line of railway
across the right of way.

l

,~r

The plaintiff in this action does not contend
that the defendants or any of them would have the
right to make any use whatever of that portion of
the right of way consisting of the tunnel bore, subject to the right of the railway to operate its trains,
because it is self-evident that the use by the owner
of such tunnel would be a constant menace not only
to a proper operation of the railway company, but
to the lives of the employees of the owner, as well
as the lives of passengers which the railway com-
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pany might carry in its cars through the tunnel.''
Counsel concede that defendants could not use any
portion of the right of way, consisting of the tunnel bore,
and yet claim that they could use the right of way upon
which the bridge is built.
the

other~

Is one more important than

Isn't the safety of the bridge equally as im-

portant as the tunnel

bore~

Let us assume the defendant

has dumped earth and waste around the steel work of the
bridge, and had endangered the safety of the bridge.
Could not the railroad company compel him to

desist~

(and we may remark in passing that the pictures of the
bridge show that plaintiff itself has

built

woodwork

around the steel for the very purpose of preventing the
dirt from the natural surface getting thereon.)
Let us assume that the defendant, Robbins, had constructed a track across the right of way for the purpose
of dumping his waste or ore on the ground adjoining the
right of way.

Where would he have built this

track~

Suppose that the very next day after he had built it, the
railroad company desired to use the ground for any purpose, would it have said that Robbins had a right to maintain the track there regardless of the use or necessity of
the railroad 1 The construction of a track for dumping
purposes by Robbins would be no slight or trivial matter;
and suppose that it was necessary in the construction of
this dump track to weaken any of the supports of the
bridge, would counsel contend that the defendant Robbins
had this righU

Or assume further, that after having
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built the track across the right of way, and had gone to
the expense of erecting cribs for the purpose of protecting his dump, and had gone to great expense and labor to
timber the stope to make it safe, and had made the dump
and track permanent, and his dump permanent, that immediately the railroad company had said, you will have
to remoYe your track; would counsel contend that it did
not have this
t-~ired

right~

If the railroad company had de-

to limit the tract sought to be condemned or limit

the use of the property sought to be condemned, it should
haYe in the first instance made the limitation or reserYation in its original petition or by some appropriate
means given the limitation or reserYation before the lease
to Robbins expired.
A careful reading of the Kansas case, upon which

counsel rely, will see that it is not in conflict with the
law as announced by the courts of practically all the
states, and eYen Kansas follows the same rule as herein
contended for, as will be seen by an examination of the
Kansas cases, thus: in Dillon YS. Kansas City, etc., Co.,
Kan. 74, Pac. 251, error was alleged because the court
bad held that plaintiff was not entitled to the concurrent
occupancy of a portion of the land flooded with water
• for the purpose of fishing and hunting, nor to the use of
water stored thereon, or ice formed on Lake Chanute.
And upon this question of concurrent occupancy, .the Supreme Court of Kansas says: Page 253.
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"Upon all these questions we think the ruling
of the court correct. As the land in question was
condemned and the easement paid for by the defendant company, it is entitled to the exclusive
control of every part thereof actually used by it
for the purpose of catching and storing water, and
also all other portions not flooded with water, but
the occupancy of which is necessary for the protection of the pond and the conservation of the
water. Railroad companies are public carriers,
and are properly held to the highest accountability in the performance of their duties. It is highly important to the general traveling public, as
well as to business interests, that such corporations have exclusive possession and uninterrupted
control of all property, the use of which is necessary in the discharge of this service. If the principle of concurrent occupation of property used by
such corporations in carrying on their regular
traffic should obtain, the expeditious and safe performance of their duties would be difficult, if not
impossible. Kans. Cent. Ry. Co. vs. Allen, 22 Kan.
286, 31 Am. Rep. 190; Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. vs. Manson,
31 Kan. 337, 2 Pac. 800; K. C. R. Co. vs. Com 'rs.
Jackson Co., 45 Kan. 716, 26 Pac. 394. There can
be no concurrent occupancy of railroad property
in actual use by it in the operation of its business
without its consent."
In S. Pa,c. Co. vs. San Francisco Sav. Union, et al.,
Cal., 70 Pac. 961-962, the court held:
"Whatever minerals lie beneath the surface
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of the right of way are reserved to the owner, and
wherever such minerals are in situ underlying
this right of way, while he may not enter upon it
to take them (because the nature of the easement
requires exclusive possession of the surface by
the company), he can drift from tunnels sunk
upon his adjoining land and do so, leaving, however, sufficient support of the easement imposed.
Subject to this support, the right of the owner of
the land to take out all minerals beneath the right
of way is absolute. Under the condemnation, the
raiiroad company acquired the permanent and exclusive control of the surface of the land, but it
acquires nothing more.''
This case seems to be decisive of the very question
in issue, the court expressly holding that the land owner
could not enter upon the right of way because exclusive
possession was in the company, but he would have to remove the minerals by drifts or tunnels from adjoining
land.
In Chicago, etc. Railway Company vs. McGrew, Mo.
15, S. W. 931, the court gave the following instruction,
page 934:
"That, except at public or private crossings,
a railroad company is entitled to the exclusive
possession of its right of way, and no person has
the right to come upon such railroad track, nor use
the surface of such right of way, for any purpose,
nor can any railroad company grant or consent to
any such use; this rule being not alone for the

benefit of the railroad, but also of the public. If
the jury believe from the evidence that none of
the devices or means introduced in evidence could
be erected or made, or, if erected or made, could
be successfully operated or used, without the
agents or employees of the defendant getting on
the right of way of plaintiff, then the jury are instructed defendant would not be permitted to erect
or maintain the same; or if, on the other hand, the
jury should believe from the evidence that the
erection, making, or maintenance of any such device under or over the track, would in any degree
endanger the operation of such railroad, or the
safety of the traveling public, no matter how slight
the danger or how improbable the occurrence may
be, the defendant would have no right to erect,
make, or maintain the same, or the railroad company any authority to consent to any such erection.''
And of this instruction the court says :
"Though the interest acquired by a railroad
company to its right of way through condemnation
proceedings, is regarded as a mere easement, yet
the law contemplates the right to an absolute and
e:xdusive possession and control thereof, as
against the private rights of the owner of the fee,
the proprietors of adjacent land, and all others. In
view of the nature of the business of the railroad
company, and its obligations to the public, such exclusive possession is necessary and proper, in or-
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der that it may perform fully

the

purpose for

which it is authorized and used. Judge Redfield,
in Jackson vs. Railroad Co., 25 Vt. 159, says:
"The railroad company must have the right
at all times to the exclusive occupancy of the land
taken and to exclude all concurrent occupancy by
the former owner in any mode and for any purpose.''
So in this State, one in no manner connected
with the railroad company, who goes upon its track
at a plnce other than a public or private crossing,
is a trespasser. No sufficient reason can be seen
why, by agreement between the parties interested,
certain rights not inconsistent with the public interest, might not have been reserved by the land
owner, so as to secure to himself a limited right of
way under such circumstances as existed in this
case. Yet such a reservation must have been by
consent of both pa1·ties; neither could have been required to ,r;rant or accept them. Defendant was
entitled to compensation in money, and could not,
without his consent, have been required to accept
in lieu thereof licenses or privileges, however beneficial to him tl~ey may seem to be. After a failure
to agree on tho compensation or other arrangements mutually satisfactory, the parties go into
court, not as contracting parties, but as antagonists, and each has the right, if he sees fit to do so,
to stand on his legal rights, and insist on his legal
remedies, and yield nothing of either."
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In Railroad Company vs. Stock Yard Co., Mo. 25
S. W. 399, the condemning company sought to show a
mitigation of damages by the fact that a driveway or
dmte for stock had been made underneath its track, thus
permitting the defendant to drive stock from one yard
to the other underneath the railroad track; the lower
court instructed the jury that this could be shown in the
mitigation of damages, but the Supreme Court of Missouri held:
"Where a railroad company condemning its
right of way through stockyards does not offer,
either in its petition or on trial, to reserve to the
owner a crossing or private way, not required b~
statute, the fact that it permits the use of such a
way under its track cannot mitigate the damage~,
since it is entitled to the use of its whole right~ of
way for railroad purposes, and revoke such permission at any time.''
See also Railway Co. vs. Clark, 25 S. W. 192, in
which last case the authorities on this question are reviewed at great length. The cases last quoted from above
are directly in point with the case at bar.

As a legal

proposition could anything be more manifest, that if
Robbins had constructed a track at any point underneath
the bridge, or had attempted to dump waste or ore upon
the right of way, that he could have been stopped at·
once.
In Fayetteville, etc., Co. vs. Combs, Ark., 11 S. W.
419, the court says:

lH
"The company has the right to the exclusive
occupancy of the land condemned when it is necessary to the proper operation of the road, and
the presumption is that it needs and intends to
use all it takes, leaving nothing of appreciable
value to the owner. Clayton vs. Ry. Co., Iowa, 25
N. W. 150. Hollingsworth vs. Iowa, 19 N. W. 323.
The company's remedy in such case is to condellln
less.''
And in Railroad Co. vs. Raymond, Minn., 33 N.

w·.

104-, it is held that:

"It is for the railroad company, seeking tJ1e
appropriation of land to its use, to indicate in its
petition, the nature and extent of the easeruent
proposed to be taken.''
And the court held that the land owner has not reserved a right of private crossing unless it is so defined.
I<~rom

the foregoing authorities it must be clear that

if the plaintiff company had desired that Robbins con::-truct tracks underneath its bridge and across its right
of way and should dump ore or waste upon the condemned premises, that it should have taken the property with
those limitations and reservations to Robbins in view.
vVhile we concede its generosity at this time, still it comes
at such a late day, more than three years after the lease
has expired, that we are unable to accept it.

Necessity

is often a virtue, and no doubt the necessities of the case
caused this sudden and generous outburst of virtue on
the part of the plaintiff.
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•.· .~
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11:··
... '

That removing of this ore was rendered impossible by the work of the plaintiff, an examination of the
following testimony will show:
Dr. Talmage testified that inasmuch as the working
of the stope was rendered practically impossible without
dump room, the lease ~as rendered practically valueless,
and that the removing of the ore so close to the tunnel
would be extremely hazardous.
Mr. Zalinski testified that the building of the bridge
and the construction of the tunnel practically wiped out
the Robbins lease.

(Abs. 177.)

Mr. Orem, a practical mining man, testified that the
work of the railroad practically wiped out Mr. Robbins'
lease. (Abs. 273.)

And also did Mr. Jones, (Abs. 274),

who teRtified that it would be practically suicide to do
any work in the Robbins stope after the construction of
the tunnel.

Also Mr. Salt, who testified to the same

thing (Abs. 279), and likewise Mr. Jennings.
As far as Mr. Robbins was concerned, the taking of
the property by the plaintiff was to eliminate him entirely and to render his lease absolutely valueless.
To show the conditions under which Mr. Robbins
would have to work to remove the ore during the progress of the work of the plaintiff, we wish to quote the
following testimony of Mr. Goodrich, the chief engineer
of the plaintiff, which testimony is found on pages 1141
and 1142 of the transcript:

21

"Q. What did your men do when they blasted 7 Leave the hill f
''A. Yes, sir.
'' Q. While they blasted 7
''A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And he (Robbins) would have to do the
same7
''A. Yes, sir.
"Q. You mean that he could carry it on provided he would subject himself to whatever might
'"" happen to him; in other words, you folks had the
right of way, and could do as you pleased, couldn't
you7
"A. Yes, sir.
'' Q. And build it as you pleased 7
''A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Well, if you folks wanted to use powder
you would use powder, wouldn't you 7
''A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Regardless of what Mr. Robbins wanted~

''A. Yes, sir.
'' Q. In other words, you would do as you
pleased, wouldn't you; build it as you pleased, regardless of what Mr. Robbins wanted 7
''A. Yes, sir.
'' Q. And he would have nothing to say about
your work or your men~
''A. No, sir.
'' Q. That was true, wasn't it~
"A. Yes, sir.
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'' Q. And it was under those conditions you
wanted him to remove the ore within this stope, a
part of which you caved while you were excavating
on the outside~ Is that true~
''A. Yes, I should think he would have to
do that.

II.
As to whether Robbins was acting in good faith m
taking the lease, and as to the amount of damages :

...

It is true that the plaintiff had caused surveys to be
made before the lease was taken by the defendant Hobbins, but these surveys were for a different route than
that actually constructed.

Mr. Robbins and Mr. Bohm

both testified that they were furnished with a may showing a proposed right of way, (this map has been intro-

.

...

duced in evidence and is now an exhibit in the case), and
it shows the projected line of the railroad at a considerable distance below where the road was finally located.
The construction of the road as thus proposed would not
have interfered in the least with the mining work or lease
of Robbins. Further, he was told that it would be necessary to move certain buildings because the road was to
be constructed on this proposed route farther down the
canyon, and he had no information whatever that the
road would be constructed where it was; in fact, all of
his information was to the contrary, and it was not until

.J

that he believed that the road would not interfere with
the leased premises that the lease was given. An examination of the testimony of Mr. Hobbins all(l ]\,1 r. Bohm,

1

I

and of others who were present at the time of the con-

t

versation referred to in plaintiff's brief, will show that
the road to be constructed was to-be at a different point
from where it was finally located. The question of good
faith was presented to the jury upon

the

conflicting

statements and evidence and the jury no doubt concluded
that Mr. Robbins did act in good faith.
That defendant Robbins believed the road would be
constructed along a different route from where it was
finally located, and that it would not interfere with his
workings, will be clearly shown by the following testimony (Abs. 57):
''At the time I took this lease I got the understanding from Mr. Bohm that the railroad was
coming at a different point from where it did
come below the point where the bridge is now. It
would be some 250 feet from where the bridge now
is. If it had come through at that point, it would
not have interfered with my working. Mr. Bohm
was furnished with a blueprint showing the right
of way at this other place.''
As heretofore stated, this is the second trial of the
cause.

The jury in the first case returned a verdict in

favor of Robbins in the sum of $4,500.00, as will be seen
by an examination of the record, page 84. Upon the second trial, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant
Robbins in the sum of $4,000.00. According to the testimony of :Mr. Robbins, he spent on the lease $500 or $600
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before the railroad company took possession (Abs. 33).
And had been damaged in the taking of the property between $12,000.00 and $15,000.00.
Mr. McCree, a mining expert and practical miner,
testified (Abs. 63) to the nature of ore that was found in
the Robbins stope, and of the nature of the ore therein,
as shown by the samples. These assays were introduced
in evidence.
and 400 tons.

His estimate of the ore was between 300
(Abs. 66.)

The values of the samples are

given (Abs. 79-80), and that the value of the ore net
to defendant Robbins was shown to be $24.91 a ton. (Abs.
88.)

Mr. Sterling B. Talmage testified to the taking of

samples and photographs (Abs. 90-91), and also to the
extent of the ore which he found within the different
workings of the so-called Robbins stope, and his estimate
from careful figuring and after making all allowances
for deductions, was 200 tons of ore that Mr. Robbins
could take out. This was ore that was actually in sight
and could be removed without any difficulty. CAbs. 317.)
Dr. James E. Talmage, a leading mining expert and
world-famed geologist, described fully how the ore made,
the samples that he took, and produced photographs
showing the ore deposits. He stated (Abs. 109) that the
ore continued in the left-hand finger of the stope 65 feet
by actual measurement; that it did not then die out, but
it passed beneath the waste on the floor.

That the vein

·appeared strong in the face, approximately three feet in

l

I
l
j

j

25
width.

That there were 225 tons of ore exposed, and

that a very conservative estimate would be 202 tons in
the stope.

(Abs. 110.)

Mr. Zalinski, another mmmg expert,

testified

to

practically the same amount of ore (Abs. 150, 151), and
of taking of samples and of the value of these samples.
(Abs. 153, 154.)
Mr. Jennings, another mining expert, testified (Abs.
303) that there were at least 225 tons of ore, and that its
net value was $29.15 per ton. (Abs. 306.)
Mr. Harry S. Knight, an ore buyer, figured the value
of the samples and assays, and, according to his values,
the ore would net more than $20.00 per ton. All this was
ore that was actually in sight, and did not take into account the ore that might or might not be uncovered in
the progress of the working and development of the mine.
The rule is well settled in this state, as well as in all other
states, that where there is substantial evidence to support
the verdict, that the court will not interfere. This rule
is almost universal, and as announced in Ry. Co. vs.
George, Mo., 47 S. W. P. 11:
"The estimate of the damages was the province of the jury, and their verdict being supported
by substantial evidence, having met with the approval of the court, we are not disposed to interfere.''
See also Seattle and etc., Co. vs. Roader, 94 Am. St.
Rep. 64, where the court says:
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"We do not feel disposed to substitute our
own judgment for that of the jury, whose duty it
is to assess the damages, merely because the
amount may seem to us large, especially where
there is abundant competent evidence upon which
to base the verdict.''

~

!

That this same rule has been adopted in this state,
the following cases will show:
Live Stock Co. vs. Live Stock Co., 43 Utah 554,
Jensen vs. Denver & Rio Grande, 138 Pac. 1185 ;
Gisborn vs. Milner, 28 Utah 438;
Thomas vs. Ogden Rapid Transit Co., 155 Pac.
436.
For counsel to contend there was no ore is the utmost folly.

The examination of their own evidence dis-

closes that they removed some of this ore from this stope
and had the same smelted or milled. This ore was mined
and milled by the plaintiff company for the purpose of
making evidence in its favor, and it did it for the purpose
of proving there was no ore of commercial value in this
block of ground; yet the ore so taken out, as shown by the
plaintiff's own evidence, was commercially profitable.
See the exhibit containing the sampling by plaintiff.
We respectfully submit there is no error in the record and that the case should be affirmed.
WILLARD HANSON,

Attorney for Defendant, Robbins.
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